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ABSTRACT 
DERRIDA, FRIENDSHIP, AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRIORITY OF THE 
‘UNTIMELY’ 
 
This paper examines Derrida’s insistence on the contretemps that breaks open time, 
paying particular attention to Politics of Friendship and the way in which this book 
envisages the ‘untimely’ as both interrupting, and making possible, friendship. 
Although I suggest that Derrida’s temporal deconstruction of the Aristotelian 
distinction between utility and ‘perfect’ friendships is convincing, I also argue that 
Derrida’s own account of friendship is itself touched by time, in the peculiar sense of 
‘touched’ that connotes affected and wounded. Derrida’s work instantiates what 
Husserl might call a transcendental pathology, in that it intermittently instantiates an 
ethics of non-presentist time (the time which is also the transcendental condition for 
the event of friendship), and, by contrast, disparages the significance of what we 
might call an ethics of phronesis, a ‘lived’ friendship of “omni-temporal” dispositions, 
and embodied and habitual patterns. I end this paper by proposing a dialectic between 
the disjunctive and conjunctive aspects of time that does not accord any kind of a 
priori privilege to the one over the other. 
 
Key words: Derrida, time, friendship, inter-subjectivity, mourning, transcendental 
arguments, Aristotle 
DERRIDA, FRIENDSHIP, AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRIORITY OF THE 
‘UNTIMELY’ 
 
Despite the intertwining that Derrida insists obtains between time and space, it is 
difficult to dispute that vast aspects of his work, both early and late, have been pre-
eminently concerned with time. The strategy of deconstruction, of course, borrows 
from Heidegger’s critique of Western philosophy’s metaphysics of presence: for 
Heidegger, our philosophical tradition (and culture) has been unable to understand 
time except as just another present entity, albeit perhaps of a special kind. While 
Derrida challenges Heidegger’s own purported overcoming of this ‘vulgar’ and 
metaphysical treatment of time, suggesting in ‘Ousia and Gramme’ that there is no 
other concept of time that might be opposed to this metaphysical onei, it remains the 
case that his work consistently invokes a time (albeit an ‘untimely time’) that disrupts 
presentist time. Moreover, as has been widely commented on, this disruptive thought 
is often associated with the future, which haunts the time of the present and cannot 
itself be rendered present. Most obviously, we might think here of his recent 
descriptions of the messianic and the ‘to come’, as Derrida analyses them in regard to 
justice and innumerable other conceptsii.  
In this particular paper, however, I wish to examine the way in which 
Derrida’s account of friendship in Politics of Friendship (hereafter PF)iii deepens his 
abiding deconstructive insistence on the contretemps that breaks open time but 
nonetheless pertains to it. Although I will suggest that Derrida’s temporal (and 
transcendental) deconstruction of the Aristotelian distinction between utility and 
‘perfect’ friendships is convincing, I will argue that his reservations about any “omni-
temporal” account of friendship, which in a quasi-Aristotelian fashion emphasises the 
centrality of stable dispositions and embodied phronesis, is less successful. Derrida’s 
objections to an understanding of friendship based upon such phenomena revolve 
around the way in which their recuperative and binding component, based on habitual 
syntheses of time (e.g. the scar), covers over a certain structure of time that is 
considered to be both ontologically prior and ethico-politically more important (e.g. 
the wound of time: the immemorial past that nonetheless subsists; the future that 
defies our expectations and is the condition for the event). However, in the manner in 
which Derrida’s position slides between (1) being an argument for this aspect of time 
as a transcendental condition, and (2) nonetheless constituting an ethical imperative of 
sorts, I will argue that Derrida’s philosophy is itself touched by time in the peculiar 
sense of ‘touched’ that connotes affected and wounded. Indeed, Derrida’s work 
appears to instantiate what Husserl might call a transcendental pathology, in that it 
intermittently instantiates an ethics of non-presentist time (the time which is 
simultaneously the transcendental condition for the event), and, by contrast, 
disparages what we might call an ethics of phronesis, a ‘lived’ friendship of “omni-
temporal” dispositions, of embodied and habitual patterns. As well as showing this 
tendency in his work, I end this paper by proposing a dialectic between these 
disjunctive and the conjunctive aspects of time (wound and scariv) that does not 
accord any kind of a priori privilege to the one over the other.  
 
UNTIMELY WOUNDS, APORIAS, AND THE (IM)POSSIBLE EVENT 
 
Before turning to the texts and themes that will be our main concern, a few 
contextualising remarks are required, specifically concerning the motif of the wound 
that I have employed in the introduction to this essay because it recurs frequently in 
Derrida’s work, as it also does in Deleuze’sv. There are at least two ways in which 
Derrida uses the term wound. Firstly, to intimate the separation that obtains between 
the orders of the possible and the impossible, in his preoccupation with what has 
come to be termed “possible-impossible” aporias – that is, with themes in which the 
condition of their possibility is also, and at once, the condition of their impossibility. 
Derrida’s paradoxical analyses of the gift, forgiveness, hospitality, etc.vi, all obey this 
logic in which, for example, the aporetic necessity to forgive the unforgivable 
constitutes a wound that is not susceptible to scarification. In this respect, Derrida 
speaks of the aporia that obtains between two terms of this kind as itself a wound: 
“tragically irreconcilable and forever wounding” (PF 22). This is the wound of 
disjunction between two laws that will not gather, exemplified for Derrida by 
democracy, which paradoxically seeks to respect singularity (and minorities) but also 
simply calculates majorities by voting and wherein each person’s vote is theoretically 
substitutable or exchangeable for any other. As we will see, this refusal to gather, to 
bind, is very important to his work. It means that a theoretical resolution is not 
possible, and that there is a constitutive “not knowing where to go”, the very 
definition that he offers of an aporia in the book of that name. As he says in Aporias, 
the point is not so much to get out from, or escape an aporetic impasse, but to invent 
“another thinking of the aporia, one perhaps more enduring”vii. This philosophy of the 
aporetic wound constitutes both an ethical priority and a transcendental necessity (for 
the event, if there is such a thing) that problematises any philosophy of dialectical 
recuperation or mediation, including pragmatisms and philosophies of the body, both 
of which he expresses serious misgivings about in all of his work but perhaps 
especially in one of his final books, On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancyviii. 
Secondly, however, the impossible term of the aporia (e.g. absolute, 
unconditional hospitality) is itself sometimes explicitly described as a wound that 
haunts the everyday conditional hospitality that we deploy, wherein we provide 
hospitality to others but only under certain carefully delineated conditions. On this 
understanding, the impossible prospect of absolute hospitality (or absolute 
forgiveness) is a wound that haunts our conditional practises of hospitality, and the 
systems of calculative exchange and political quid pro quo. Another important 
example of this second understanding of the wound occurs in Derrida’s recent 
discussion of the trauma of 9/11 in one of his final books, Rogues: Two Essays on 
Reason. Derrida suggests that the trauma that results from an act like the planes 
targeting the twin towers is not simply an effect that follows from a cause (i.e. the 
planes hitting the towers and the devastating death-toll). There is this order of 
causality, of course, but there is also another order of causality that Derrida might 
follow the Deleuze of Logic of Sense and call the quasi-causeix. Indeed, Derrida goes 
on to say that the trauma resides not so much in what actually happened (the order of 
the empirical cause) but more in:  
The undeniable fear or apprehension of a threat that is worse and still to come. 
The trauma remains traumatising and incurable because it comes from the 
future. For the virtualx can also traumatise. Trauma takes place when one is 
wounded by a wound that has not yet taken place… its temporalisation 
proceeds from the to come (my italics)xi.  
It is important to recognise, however, that this logic and this curious temporality are 
not distinctive to 9/11. For Derrida, all traumas are of this order. In fact, all events are 
of this order (including friendship as we will see) in which, to emphasise Derrida’s 
point, one is “wounded by a wound that has not yet taken place”. We might recall 
Lewis Carroll’s Alice, who cries before pricking herself, and there is a related sense 
in which we are all wounded by the unknowable prospect of the future. Certainly, for 
Derrida, any event worthy of the name must involve a confounding of linear time, or 
the time of the present, including both so-called ‘lived time’ (produced through 
habitual syntheses of anticipation), and the time of calculation and prediction (based 
on the objective time of clocks). There is a futural synthesis of time that defies both of 
these attempts to come to grips with it, and which, while it is wounding, is also the 
transcendental condition of friendship. Indeed, in precisely the same manner in which 
Derrida argues that we are wounded by a wound that has not yet taken place, so he 
suggests in friendship “we are plunged before mourning, into mourning” (PF 14). Let 
us attempt to come to terms with this transcendental anteriority, this “pre-originary 
mourning”, and what it might involve, via a discussion of his deconstruction of the 
Aristotelian understanding of friendship. 
 
FRIENDSHIP AND THE MOURNING OF TIME 
  
Derrida’s engagement with Aristotle in Politics of Friendship has been widely 
discussed. Although it eludes pithy summaries, one major feature of it is to insist that 
Aristotle’s famous distinction between perfect (or good) friendships and more utility 
or pleasure-oriented manifestations of friendship is untenable due to temporal factors. 
As Derrida consistently puts it, “it takes time to do without time”, which is to suggest 
that the apparent purity of a friendship (e.g. concern for the other for their own sake, 
uncontaminated by self-interest) must always have been tested over time (PF 17). We 
can also ascribe to Derrida a related argument against the stability that a friendship 
develops over a period of time – although this second argument does not follow quite 
as well as the first – and to any primacy that is accorded to embodied coping within 
an environment, in the manner that Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Hubert Dreyfus 
have all endorsed. For Derrida, any friendship must have experienced this futural 
recognition that whatever arrangements may now be in place (e.g. meeting for a beer 
each Friday afternoon, being open and honest with one another, etc.), they must have 
passed through an ordeal of time – and one never completely passes through this 
ordeal – in which these arrangements were subject to revision and to contestation. In 
other words, in order to have a reasonably stable friendship (or achieve something 
close to an embodied equilibrium through habits, skills, intentional arcs, etc.) one 
must first have had some kind of experience of the future as unlimited and of nothing 
dictating that the friendship will continue; this is the trauma of apprenticeship. 
Moreover, not only does a stable friendship need to traverse this unstable order of 
time in which this openness towards the future is experienced unabated (PF 16), but 
Derrida also intimates that even after having endured this trial of friendship, we still 
ought to think (and to live) friendship with an “open heart” (PF 30), open to the 
“perhaps” which engages the only possible thought of the event and the future (PF 
29). The aporetic and traumatic is hence not only the condition of friendship, 
normality, etc., but it also serves as an ethico-political injunction that might be 
formulated as follows: respect the aporetic dimension of friendship, do not cover over 
the wound. Indeed, Derrida repeatedly describes recognising, rather than covering 
over the aporia, as a condition of responsibility (A 16)xii.  
We will return to this, but contrary to the famous Aristotelian account of 
friendship in Book 8 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Derrida hence argues that 
friendship should not be too stable, and should not railroad the future into its habitual 
expectations, which is to deny not only the difference of the other person, but also the 
more radical difference that time insinuates into any and every friendship. According 
to his quasi-transcendental argument (it is ‘quasi-transcendental’ because it also 
renders pure friendship of the Aristotelian variety impossible), the apparently stable 
aspect of what we might call ‘lived friendship’ is always broken open by this radical 
future, this temporal wound (which we mourn) that paradoxically precedes friendship, 
firstly in the trial and the test, in the selecting and preferring, in the question and the 
objection. Without this, there is no friendship but mere robotic acquiescence, and yet, 
at the same time, this test also interrupts any neat and easy distinction between pure 
(perfect) friendship and its more utility oriented manifestations. According to Derrida, 
it even problematises any too-easy friend/enemy distinction, upon which the political 
philosophy of Carl Schmitt relies, as has the foreign policies of successive US 
governments in their consistent refrains concerning rogue states and the now famous 
‘axis of evil’. Indeed, Derrida suggests that: “The possibility, the meaning and the 
phenomenon of friendship would never appear unless the figure of the enemy had 
already called them up in advance, had indeed put to them the question or objection of 
the friend, a wounding question, a question of wound. No friend without the possible 
wound” (PF 153). 
On what basis might Derrida begin to justify such a claim? Well, if Aristotle is 
right that we cannot have too many friends (and Derrida thinks he is, because we 
cannot spend the required amount of time and attention with each), this complicates 
Aristotle’s own more general claim that genuine friendship involves loving the other 
person for their own sake, and not just for the utility or pleasure that we might derive 
from the friendship. After all, friendship takes time to develop, and this time cannot 
be given to everyone. We cannot be genuine friends, in the Aristotelian sense, with 
lots of people. For Derrida, there is hence a type of oligarchy at the heart of friendship 
and it is not the great model for democracy that Aristotle and others have suggested it 
is. This is so even without considering those who were overtly excluded from the 
Athenian fraternal band of friends – women and slaves – because Derrida also shows 
the subtle privileging of fraternity, brotherhood, and ties of allegiance and filiation 
that have surrounded the Western history of ruminations on friendship. But to return 
to Derrida’s key point, despite this oligarchy at the heart of friendship we nonetheless 
generally want the most and best forms of friendship possible, and we hence must 
prefer certain friends to others, and make choices between who will, and who will not 
be, our friends. Among other things, this means that we must calculate with our 
friends, which is precisely what Aristotle argues that we ought not do with good (or 
perfect) friends. For Aristotle, we do not, and should not, use them as means to our 
own ends and try to deduce their worth to us, but, for Derrida, this is inevitable 
because we must prefer certain friends to others. We must put the chosen one(s) 
through the test by living with them, and in order to establish who we will try this 
with, there is always a choice, a decision, and it involves (as well as an undecidable 
leap) calculating whether or not these prospective friends are good for us personally 
and give us pleasure. Our focus cannot be restricted to whether or not a friend is good 
in him or herself, as Aristotle’s position suggests, because even if we imagine 
ourselves to be a good citizen seeking eudaimonia and the cultivation of our virtues 
there are nonetheless likely to be plenty of people who we recognise as being good 
but whom we nevertheless do not want to be friends with. For Derrida then, 
Aristotle’s distinction is too quick: friendship requires that the friend be good in 
themselves (and hence loved for their own sake), and also for them to be good for us 
(and hence give us pleasure and utility), which requires prudential judgment about 
what is in our interests.  
I think that this analysis is largely correct, insofar as time does problematise 
any idealistic account of ‘pure’ or ‘perfect’ friendship like Aristotle’sxiii. Whether it 
equally successfully problematises the virtue that Aristotle associates with a stable 
friendship (i.e. what Derrida refers to as the ‘omni-temporal’ relationship that we 
acquire with the world and others through a process of hexis and phronesis), however, 
is not quite so clear, and even less clear is whether the establishing of any such 
transcendental priority also legitimates the ethical impetus that Derrida also gives it, 
in his explicit and implicit suggestions that true friendship ought to be open (recall his 
phrase an ‘open heart’) to the temporal wound that is its condition.  
Less commonly acknowledged but perhaps even more important for my 
argument that Derrida’s analysis of friendship is ‘touched by time’ in sometimes 
problematic ways, is the manner in which Politics of Friendship also anticipates 
certain themes that came to prominence in other books like Adieu To Emmanuel 
Levinas, Work of Mourning, and that were already apparent in Memoires for Paul de 
Manxiv. To put it bluntly, for Derrida, friendship is inexorably bound up with 
mourning. While it might be protested that mourning is merely a structural possibility 
of friendship rather than a necessity as the above quotation from Derrida seems to 
suggest – “no friend without the possible wound” (PF 153) – it is important to 
recognise that this structural possibility contaminates, and is the condition for, 
anything that happens. As Derrida explicitly suggests:  
Here again, the difference between the effective and the virtual, between 
mourning and its possibility, seems fragile and porous… The anguished 
apprehension of mourning (without which the act of friendship would not 
spring forth in its very energy) insinuates itself a priori and anticipates itself; it 
haunts and plunges the friend, before mourning, into mourning (PF 14).  
As we saw with his account of the trauma of 9/11 (“trauma takes place when one is 
wounded by a wound that has not yet taken place”),  the event of friendship only takes 
place when (and if) its temporalisation proceeds from, and is wounded by, the future 
that is still ‘to come’. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for friendship, in 
that without this ‘wounding’ or ‘haunting’ we will merely be indifferent towards the 
other person, never passing beyond a relationship of casual acquaintance (there is 
hence a minimal sense in which Derrida agrees with Aristotle, even while he points to 
the way Aristotle’s argument simultaneously undermines itself).  
We can also understand this originary mourning in the Levinasian sense that 
one mourns the death of the other (and is responsible to them) in advance of their 
actual death. Indeed, like Levinas, Derrida insists that the more fundamental wound is 
the prospect of the other’s death, rather than one’s own death, as in Heidegger’s 
famous account of Dasein resolutely confronting its “being-towards-death” in Being 
and Time: the death of the other is the first death, ontologically or metaphysically 
speaking (A 39). But Derrida also means more than this. He comments in Aporias that 
neither Heidegger, Freud, nor even Levinas, take into account the originary mourning 
that is his primary concern (A 39) – indeed, he goes as far as to say that Being and 
Time has nothing to say about mourning at all (A 60). Derrida explicitly states that if 
the feeling of mineness (Jemeinigkeit) or self-identity is constituted by an originary 
mourning, as he thinks it is, then “the relation to the other (in itself outside myself, 
outside myself in myself) will never be distinguishable from a bereaved 
apprehension” (A 61). The argument here is clearly an expanded one: not only 
friendship, but any relation to the other involves some kind of bereaved apprehension 
or originary mourning. The warrant for this extension is not immediately apparent, 
but for our current purposes it is sufficient to observe that this is a curiously 
melancholic sentiment. If there is also an ethical impetus bound up with this 
wounding aspect of time (the future that haunts), as I have suggested that there is, 
then it is in this sense that Derrida’s work can be said to institute a transcendental 
pathology; one aspect of time – its wounding component which we mourn – has both 
a transcendental priority and an ethical privilege over the time that binds, the omni-
temporal time that scars. In fact, this is my key claim in this paper, so it is worth 
considering in greater detail how this transcendental/ethical obfuscation might take 
place in Derrida’s work.  
It is important to note that these subtly different understandings of ‘originary 
mourning’xv as peculiar to the event of friendship, or as a condition of any relation to 
the other at all, correspond to a problem upon which Derrida’s philosophy is 
avowedly situated, but which nonetheless seems to involve the obfuscation of the 
transcendental and the normative, and thus, on my view, ultimately makes possible 
Derrida’s ethics of non-presentist time. For Derrida, any relation to the other must 
involve a pre-originary mourning, and yet he also argues that friendship, if there is 
such a thing, is premised on this pre-originary mourning and ought to embrace rather 
than turn away from this condition: the former claim is Derrida weighing into more 
traditional transcendental philosophy; the latter claim also more clearly gives this 
mourning an ethical and normative dimension.  
This dual status of his key transcendental claims recurs throughout many of 
his major concepts. There is an unresolved tension, for example, between whether 
events are to be understood to necessarily happen all of the time (in the discussions of 
iterability and difference in his early work this seems to be the case), and yet he is 
also prone to employing a more genealogical logic which suggests that such and such 
must be the case for any “event worthy of the name”, often with an added clause such 
as, “if there is such a thing as an event”. Interestingly, Derrida also seems to suggest 
that there is, in fact, a necessary overcoming or confusion of the is/ought divide in any 
event worthy of the name. This is perhaps clearest in his discussions of the US 
declaration of independence in ‘Otobiographies’, along with his essay on this same 
theme in Negotiationsxvi. The declaration of independence seeks to describe or ratify 
an already existing state of affairs, but at the same time its validity is invented through 
this act of naming, this performance, which also suggests what ought to be the case. 
Consider the famous passage: “We therefore the representatives of the United States 
of America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the 
world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by the authority of the 
good people of these Colonies, solemnly declare and publish that these United 
Colonies are and of right ought to be free and independent states”. Manifest in this 
statement is a description of a state of affairs (the assembled people, even though they 
are not yet legitimately representatives), and the imperative regarding what ought to 
be the case (their being representatives of free and independent states), and it is the 
performative aspect of the declaration that makes possible the transition from the one 
to the other in a relatively seamless wayxvii. This analysis of Derrida’s is insightful, 
and it bears some relationship to his account of friendship as we will see, but the 
movement between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ that features here also persists in more 
troubling ways in Derrida’s own work. 
Indeed, a similar structure undergirds his work on the decision, yet another 
example of a concept that is simultaneously impossible within its own internal logic 
and yet nevertheless necessary. He sometimes suggests things like “the decision, if 
there is such a thing as a decision”xviii and hence can claim that he is merely analysing 
the logic of the decision. More commonly, he asserts that the various decisions that 
we do make must be structured by the experience of the undecidable (which is thus 
the transcendental condition of any particular decisions that we do make). Quite 
frequently, however, he also argues, or implies, that our actual concrete decisions not 
only ought to be structured by this experience but they ought to embrace, rather than 
turn away from, this conditionxix. This formulation allows for degrees, and an ethico-
political orientation that the transcendental argument itself should not admit. In 
‘Ethics and Politics Today’, Derrida makes this explicit. He comments that the 
strategy of deconstruction, and its deployment of transcendental arguments should be 
considered to be primarily “pre-ethical-political”, but he cannot resist going on to add 
that it in fact simultaneously is ethico-political, precisely because it prescriptively 
insists on this preliminary ‘pre’ that must accompany all responsible decision-
makingxx. Here is where the normative comes in, a normativity that paradoxically 
grants an ethico-political privilege to a transcendental condition over what we might 
call the extra-transcendental, or the empirical. The problem then, revolves around 
whether we understand Derrida primarily as a genealogist of concepts, as an 
undisguised transcendental philosopher, or as an ethicist, albeit in a highly restricted 
sense. For me, however, he trades on this ambiguity and it allows him to imbue this 
transcendental temporal wound with a normative dimension that is never satisfactorily 
justified. As such, I think he makes almost precisely the same mistake he accuses 
Heidegger of, when in ‘Ousia and Gramme’ he rejects Heidegger’s quasi-ethical 
distinction between authentic and vulgar time. 
I will continue to try and bring this out in regard to the relationship between 
time and friendship. What, after all, does Derrida’s paradoxical suggestion that 
without a certain kind of transcendental mourning (the wound) there is no friendship 
mean? How might one be plunged before mourning into mourning? What exactly are 
we mourning in the pre-originary mourning of friendship? As well as the prospect of 
the death of the other, it seems that at a more fundamental level what we are 
mourning is time. Although this cannot be understood to entail a mere lament that 
time is passing (an attitude of ressentiment for Nietzsche), we mourn the future, since 
it is from the future that death, trauma, loss, come. Moreover, we have already seen 
how time disrupts and problematises friendship. The time of stable and habitual 
friendship is the time of confidence and chronology; Derrida’s etymology of the term 
confidence draws outs its links with fidelity, faithfulness, the sensible duration of time 
(PF 14). But it takes time to do without time in this manner, it takes trials and tests, 
and these memorial wounds are always there and never dispensed with (PF 15). 
Indeed, Derrida emphasises that a condition of stable friendship, of what he calls 
“cultivated aptitude”, is this contretemps that is associated with both the past and the 
future (PF 16). This condition of (im)possibility of friendship is the time of the 
irruptive wound, which “gives itself only its withdrawal (PF 14), and disjoins 
presentist time while it also pertains to it.  
In this context, it is also worth reflecting on that famous statement attributed 
to Aristotle by many since the middle-ages, but always without any concrete referent, 
and from which Derrida begins each of his chapters in Politics of Friendship: ‘O my 
friends, there is no friend’. This paradoxical statement seems to undermine the tenor 
of Aristotle’s work on friendship in the Nichomachean Ethics, and it is also important 
to Derrida because it is split between two temporal orders and hence not a simple 
contradiction: the first clause invokes those friends who have been or those friends 
who will be (its performative element either calls them forth or recalls them – this is 
the time of the future and the past); the second clause is irremediably of the present in 
its assertion of the definitive, factual statement that there is no friend. There is no 
good or perfect friend, because friendship is split between these orders, never 
unambiguously present and self-contained. It is haunted by the trial with which it 
developed and began (memorial time), as well by the future (the death of the other). 
We mourn the split or wound of time, that is to say the way in which friendship is 
never finally given but must be re-performed and re-invigorated, and also the way in 
which friendship is never pure but always also compromised, fallible, and liable to 
transformation, including the possibility of an unforgivable rupture.  
At the same time, in a certain sense we must also celebrate this wound, 
however, for without it no friendship is possible. Why Derrida feels compelled to use 
loaded terms like ‘mourning’ and ‘wound’ for this aspect of time hence remains an 
open question, albeit one that is more explicable if one agrees with my argument that 
Derrida’s philosophy of time instantiates a transcendental pathology, in that a 
surreptitious ethics (with a melancholic inflection) is derived from a transcendental 
analysis. On his view, however, this split is also what makes possible the event, the 
new, and difference, to momentarily treat them as synonyms. As Derrida suggests, 
“the disposition, the aptitude, even the wish – everything that makes friendship 
possible and prepares it – does not suffice for friendship, for friendship in act… the 
analysis of conditions of possibility, even existential ones (e.g. habit), will never 
suffice in giving an account of the act or the event” (PF 17). Indeed, Derrida’s basic 
critique of habit, skills and phronesis (as they apply to friendship) in Politics of 
Friendship is, as we have seen, that they are “omni-temporal” (PF 16, 20) and cover 
over the gap between two different temporal orders.  
And it seems to me that Derrida is right in this respect; corporeal responses to 
our friends do form habitual patterns, and the ‘transcendental time’ that haunts 
friendship (the wound that come from both the past and the prospect of an unknown 
future) is covered over in our typical phenomenological experiences of friendshipxxi. 
However, it should be noted that these patterns that any friendship partakes in, far 
from suggesting any kind of mechanistic stagnation, are in fact what allow us to 
‘intuitively’ or ‘pre-reflectively’ notice that something is different or amiss with a 
friend, and thus to transform our relation to the individual in question. This applies to 
moral considerations pertaining to friendship in a structurally isomorphic way to our 
general coping with equipment and objects in the world, even though it is also clear 
that the telos of our relations with others is not ease of use, or getting things done, as 
might be said to typify our more general copingxxii. Certainly, Aristotle, Merleau-
Ponty, Hubert Dreyfus, and many others have shown us that these corporeal 
adjustments towards others involve a sophisticated feedback loop and are not merely 
mechanistic and unthinking reactions that pay no attention to the distinctiveness or 
alterity of the other; in fact, they enable the other’s particularity (and their needs) to 
come forth. Practical wisdom just is this ability, which can be developed over a period 
of time, to respond in the appropriate manner to the consistently changing 
circumstances that one is presented with; it is based on the development of skills, 
moral virtues, etc., within a community. These embodied and pre-reflective 
judgments are themselves thus a transcendental condition of friendship of sorts. And 
while it is true that they take time to develop (that is, it takes time for us to become 
morally mature and suitably attentive to the specificities of our friend and their 
situation), it is also the case that such abilities are always already at work in any 
relation to the other, and in friendship. My point in this regard is a simple one: 
although this omni-temporal time “does not suffice for friendship”, as Derrida 
compellingly suggests, it is nonetheless as central and important to friendship as is the 
split or wound that he more forcefully insists upon.  
More critically for my purposes here, it also remains unclear and something 
akin to an unjustified point of faith in Derrida’s work as to why the temporal wound 
in friendship should have a normative and ethico-political impetus (respect the 
wound; be open to the perhaps, etc.) that is missing from his occasional descriptions 
of more existential and embodied conditions of possibility. One of Derrida’s 
interviews published in A Taste for the Secret is revelatory in this regard. As well as 
affirming the importance of Kierkegaard to his own work, he suggests that his 
intention was never “to draw away from the concern for existence itself, for concrete 
personal commitment, or from the existential pathos that, in a sense, I have never 
lost… In some ways, a philosopher without the ethico-existential pathos does not 
interest me very much” (my italics)xxiii. In the case of the major existentialist thinkers, 
their phenomenological and existential descriptions gave this ‘ethico-existential 
pathos’ some content, and in the more subtle and nuanced of these thinkers they were 
always moderated by a recognition of the importance of bodily equilibria, the ready-
to-hand, etc. In taking the transcendental turn in the manner that he does, Derrida’s 
‘existentialism’ is one without either of these anchorsxxiv. As such, his is an ethical 
pathos enshrined by a transcendental philosophy (and, tacitly, a hierarchy) of time, or, 
if we think he remains faithful to his early declaration that there is no concept of time 
other than the metaphysical one (cf. A 14), it is a hierarchy of the untimely on the one 
hand, and the metaphysics of presence that it disrupts on the other hand. Of course, 
that is not to deny that, for Derrida, the two hands must be intertwined, in that the 
former contretemps must always also pertain to time, especially in the manner that the 
future and past haunt and interrupt any metaphysics of the present. Nonetheless, that 
does not mitigate the lack of attention that Derrida accords to corporeal phronesis 
(which is arguably not reducible to a metaphysics of presence in any casexxv), and it 
does not account for the manner in which his brief references to it always 
conspicuously lack the ethical flavour that accompanies his descriptions of the time of 
the past and the future, which are, for him, the transcendental conditions for the 
present and for friendship.  
In this context, it is worth briefly observing that Deleuze’s philosophy is based 
upon some rather similar convictions, certainly in his canonical works, Difference and 
Repetition and Logic of Sense. While Deleuze is rather less explicitly concerned with 
the problem of a metaphysics of presence, Derrida’s view of the temporal split that 
makes possible friendship bears some important and often overlooked proximities to 
Deleuze’s understanding of the event and its ties to the future and the past (Aion), 
rather than to the present (Chronos) and mere states of affairs. For Deleuze, as for 
Derrida, both the event and an understanding of the way in which time divides 
ceaselessly toward the future and the past are accorded a transcendental priorityxxvi, 
whereas habit, for example, is to be understood empirically and as part of the field of 
the possible and hence not directly pertaining to the virtual and the eventxxvii. Possible 
questions and objections begin to rear their heads here, which relate to the work of 
Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus, and others. For example, do their detailed descriptions of the 
varia of embodied life, including solicitations to act and the skilful establishment of 
intentional arcs in a transcendental field, show us something akin to a virtuality of 
coping? Is there a transcendental corporeality, contrary to what empiricists might 
maintain?xxviii  
While these questions cannot be comprehensively pursued here, the failure to 
consider them is nonetheless further evidence of a pathology of time at work in 
Derrida, an anti-presentism that eschews the time of Chronos, the orderly succession 
of presents in linear time and the habitual certitudes of the senses (including 
commonsense). A certain wound of time that he has given various names operates as 
both a transcendental condition and, at times, as a hierarchical and privileged ethical 
term. While it is difficult to dispute Derrida’s forceful analyses of the co-imbrication 
and contamination that time institutes, it is far from clear that this justifies an ethical 
priority to be accorded to but one aspect of time, the disjunctive and the wounding. 
Derrida’s arguments toward this conclusion too often beg the question and assume the 
importance of this temporal disruption. But what kind of ethics and politics does this 
valorisation of the event as rupture (as outside of the order of possibility) have? Is it 
sufficient? Clearly not, even according to Derrida for any concrete political actionxxix, 
and it is not sufficient for an account of friendship. Indeed, in both of these respects 
phenomenologies of the body are central: the fact that the body excludes things from 
our particular horizons of significance is not something that should be ignored, nor 
should the way in which they involve an omni-temporal binding that covers over gaps 
and aporias, without suggesting they are not there. Time, it seems, unsurprisingly 
enough, is complicated. And while it would be difficult to deny that Derrida grasps 
this complication, I hope to have shown that he nonetheless imports an a priori 
judgment about which aspects of time are most significant and of the most value. 
While time wounds us in the senses enumerated so well by Derrida, lived time also 
scarifies these wounds, covers them over through an omni-temporal time that 
conjoins, and this is not unimportant to friendship. In fact, we might even reverse 
Derrida’s formulations and say that there is no friendship without scarification, 
without a confused and ambiguous present, something that is occluded and 
downplayed in Derrida’s temporal and ethical decisions. 
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